about; and second, by investigating the exact articulation of asserted, presupposed, and implied information in the utterance of a metaphor. On such an account, in a context of, say, personality properties, a metaphor like John is a wolf expresses the assertion that John has a particular property, say, cruelty; it presupposes the thematic dimension of personality properties.
I still believe this account to be substantially correct. Independently, and earlier, Josef Stern had developed a similar approach inspired by Kaplan's logic of demonstratives.
2 In this paper, I will contrast this account with two rival approaches that have gained prominence, or a renewed lease of life, in more recent years. First, I will discuss the thesis that metaphor involves semantic underdeterminacy rather than contextdependence, as defended by Jay David Atlas; second, I discuss the recent attempt by two advocates of so-called 'semantic minimalism' to rehabilitate Donald Davidson's controversial account, which denies metaphor all meaning or cognitive content; third, I
explore whether these accounts do justice to the context-dependence of metaphor, as argued for by authors like Stern and myself, and try to provide some principled argumentation as to exactly what kind of context-dependence is involved in metaphor.
Atlas: two dogmas of literary modernism
In 'Metaphor, nonspecific meaning, and utterance interpretation: Two dogmas of literary modernism', chapter 1.1. of his Logic, Meaning, and Conversation (2005) , Jay David
Atlas inveighs against two dogmas that, he claims, inform twentieth-century philosophy of language as much as studies of literary style. 3 The first, and most important, dogma is the belief in an essential cleavage between literal (or 'ordinary') and figurative (or 'literary') language; the second dogma is the belief that metaphors are literally false or anomalous, because they involve a 'category mistake', or a 'violation of selection restrictions,' and that it is precisely the impossibility of determining an adequate literal meaning that triggers the hearer to construe an alternative, figurative interpretation. In fact, Atlas argues, this second dogma amounts to a reduction of metaphoricity to semantic anomaly (2005: 13) . Closely related to this dogma, he adds, is the belief that such category mistakes or anomalies nevertheless have meaning (at what we would call the level of speaker's meaning), and that these meanings "may vary from person to person, are probably not recursively specifiable, and are highly sensitive to context" (2005: 12) .
Many of the arguments in favor of the literal-figurative distinction, he continues, are circular, in that they presuppose some version of that distinction. The more important question, however, is whether it does any explanatory work in linguistics; on his own account, it does not (2005: 11) . Thus, Atlas does not claim, with Relevance Theorists like Sperber & Wilson (1986) , that metaphor and literal language differ in degree rather than kind; instead, he rejects the distinction between literal and metaphorical language altogether. 4 On his account, metaphors are what he calls 'semantically general' or 'semantically indeterminate' between a literal and a metaphorical reading: by themselves, they do not express any proposition and do not have determinate truth conditions. rejecting formalist or structuralist attempts to characterize metaphor in structural syntactic or semantic terms, he argues that metaphors are very much like other semantically general, but literal, sentences; hence, there is no distinction between literal and metaphorical language to be drawn at all, or put differently: there is no difference in logical type, whatever the differences in perlocutionary effect may be (2005: 15) .
Metaphor, Atlas concludes, is a perfectly ordinary aspect of ordinary language, which, like semantic underdeterminacy more generally, "provides us the economical alternative to vast elaborations of primitive vocabulary and conceptual distinctions" (2005: 16).
On Atlas's account, modernism's main mistake lies in treating metaphor as something out of the ordinary. Human genius, he argues, lies not with the creation of poetic metaphors, but rather with the exact opposite: with the creation of a realm of 'purely 4 An account in terms of enrichment or loosening, as has become popular in Relevance-Theoretical circles (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1986 , Carston 2010 , Bezuidenhout 2001 , also seems too unconstrained to account for the relatively determinate content that metaphors acquire in particular contexts, but that is not yet a decisive argument against it: one might simply postulate a set of additional contextual constraints operating after the loosening that, as Relevance Theorists claim, generates a broader range of possible interpretations.
literal' use of language, especially in mathematics and physics (2005: 16) . 5 Thus, he concludes, logical empiricism and literary modernism are guilty of the same mistake:
they take the language of science as the norm rather than as the exception (2005: 16) .
In this context, Atlas -rightly, I believe -traces the doctrine or dogma that poetic language is emotive rather than cognitive or rational in nature to John Locke's famousor notorious -rejection of rhetorical eloquence, and by implication, all figurative language, as designed "for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment;" 6 but we could elaborate on the precise character of, and motives for, this doctrine as originally found in Locke and as elaborated in later authors. Recently, Bauman & Briggs (2003: ch. 2) have argued that Locke's 'purification' of literal meaning was part and parcel, not just of a philosophical project of making ordinary language fit for epistemological purposes, but of a downright political project of restricting legitimate public debate to specific kinds of language (literal language that does not move passions seen as feminine) and specific classes of speakers (gentlemen, i.e., upper-class males). Likewise, the objection that the logical positivists, in their legitimate critique of metaphysics, not only threw away poetic language with the anti-metaphysical bathwater, but reduced vast areas of intuitively significant everyday language to the status of meaningless pseudopropositions, has been raised before (see e.g.
Levinson 1983: 227); but it has been observed less often that this criticism of metaphysics was at least in part motivated by political concerns (in particular the struggle against nationalism, antisemitism, and the continuing societal dominance of the Catholic church), and in turn implied a problematic 'politics of language' of its own. Such analyses open up the vast field of the political aspects of language and speech, a topic sadly neglected in analytical philosophy of language and its empirical offshoots.
Atlas makes a number of further observations on metaphor in a more recent, and as of yet Even with these later additions, however, Atlas's argument is at best incomplete, as it gives no detailed account, or even an outline, of the actual process of metaphorical interpretation. Some of the main formal features of such an account are clear, however.
First, it does not simply involve semantic ambiguity or context-dependence, implying that semantically, a metaphor does not express a determinate proposition even given a context of utterance; 0n this view, a metaphor in isolation expresses neither a proposition nor even a function from contexts to propositions (i.e., a character in Kaplan's sense).
Second, Atlas argues that the process of metaphorical interpretation involves a pragmatic 'inference to the best interpretation,' analogous to, but not identical with, Peirce's 7 Atlas construes Frost's contrast between the grammatical sentence and the vital sentence as one between a grammatically well-formed string of words and the utterance of the grammatical sentence in a particular context (2017: 69); but Frost himself appears to reject the former more radically, arguing against the very idea that the sentence is a 'grammatical cluster of words;' the [vital] sentence, he argues, is a 'sound in itself apart from the word sounds,' whereas the grammatical sentence, typically written than spoken, is 'merely accessory to the other' (Frost 1995: 681 Having myself both rejected the notion of literal meaning as a myth and criticized the assumption of falsehood or anomaly as a criterion for metaphor (Leezenberg 2001: 87-88; 301-304) , I have considerable sympathy for Atlas's identification, and rejection, of both dogmas of literary modernism. On several points of substance, however, notably his claim that metaphor involves semantic generality rather than context-dependence (and hence is interpreted using pragmatic principles rather than semantic rules), I am not convinced. I will not enter into a discussion of these claims straight away, however, but first present another view, which has become as influential as it is controversial.
Davidson and Rorty: Dogmas of Romantic Pragmatism
Atlas's criticisms appear to apply with full force to one of the more notorious analytical- The reason for Davidson's silence and ambivalence is presumably his hesitance to draw the the all-too-radical, and highly implausible, conclusion that metaphor falls outside the realm of communication altogether. This is, however, exactly the conclusion drawn by Richard Rorty: he explicitly claims that metaphors are causes rather than representations of beliefs, and as such fall outside the realm of rational and intentional communication: In illustration of this claim, Rorty likens metaphor to birdsong: it may be a stimulus or cause to knowledge, he writes; but in itself, it falls outside the rational practice of giving and asking for reasons. Whatever its philosophical motivation, the doctrine that metaphor does not involve metaphorical meanings runs into serious difficulties, and has met with substantial criticisms. In fact, in a later paper, 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs ' (2005 [1986] ), Davidson appears to withdraw or contradict virtually every substantial claim he had made on metaphor. Although this paper strictly speaking concerns malapropisms or 'slips of the tongue' rather than metaphors, its implications for his earlier views are obvious.
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The existence of such malapropisms, Although a speaker using a metaphor may intend to draw a hearer's attention to similarities, this is not, they claim, an intention to convey a propositional content p, i.e., he does not "elicit an effect given by p in his audience by means of recognizing the speaker's intention to elicit this effect" (2010: 170). Unlike or against Davidson (1984) and Rorty (1987) , they unequivocally argue that a speaker uttering a metaphor is engaged in intentional communication, or, as they call it, 'cooperative interaction;' but like them, they reject the idea that she is communicating a meaning, i.e., a content that "must be This argument puts far too strong a priori constraints on what one can and cannot do with metaphors; one can, of course, intend to do all kinds of things in using a metaphor, whether to 'put things before our eyes', to invite or to suggest, to praise or to insult, to appeal to the audience's expectations or to play on its emotions. There seems to be no good reason why all, and only, metaphors should involve the particular intention to non- Davidson (1984) and Rorty (1987) . It also suggests that, with respect to metaphor at least, the notion of a 'minimal proposition,' too, may reproduce a problematic -if not dogmatic -notion of literal meaning rather than providing a novel explanatory account. 
Dogmas Aside
Despite the obvious differences between Davidson's and Atlas's accounts of metaphor, there are some intriguing convergences between semantic minimalism and semantic generalism. In his discussion of semantic minimalism, Atlas (2007) There are several recent accounts of metaphor that resemble Atlas's, most importantly in claiming that metaphor involves Gricean inferencing even if it does not rest on a defective or anomalous literal meaning. Thus, the 'direct expression view' proposed by Bezuidenhout (2001) rejects the view of metaphor as a case of classical (particularized) conversational implicature triggered by an apparently inappropriate, uninformative, or trivial literal interpretation; but the interpretive mechanism she suggests is clearly of a Gricean character, as it involves a defeasible process of inferring or 'calculating' the speaker's intentions on the basis of assumptions -held to be universal -about the speaker's rationality. Likewise, Recanati's self-proclaimed 'quasi-contextualist' position resembles Atlas's in its rejection of the notion of a minimal proposition as 'theoretically useless ' (2004: 86) , and in its conviction that large areas of language interpretation, including metaphor, involve pragmatic principles rather than semantic rules. On
Recanati's account, semantic interpretation only yields a 'semantic schema' or a 'propositional radical' rather than a full-blown proposition. 16 In Tempting as this conclusion is, however, it should be put to the test: one would like to see whether we can actually prove, rather than merely claim, that metaphorical interpretations involve Gricean inferencing rather than semantic-context-dependence.
Recanati argues that from a psychological point of view, it is impossible to separate purely semantic interpretation based on rules and a more pragmatic, optional process of enrichment or loosening representations; both, he suggests, are "indissociable, mutually dependent aspects of a single process of pragmatic interpretation" (2001: 88). If we follow this argument to its logical conclusion, we may well end up with the claim that literal meaning, or sentence meaning, is an illusion; but Recanati appears to stop short of this claim. Thus, despite their similarities, Bezuidenhout and Recanati are not quite as bold as Atlas in rejecting the notion of literal meaning as an unfounded dogma.
But dogmas aside, how can we adjudicate between the minimalist approach, the semantic generality view, and a 'literalist', or, as I would prefer to call it, a direct contextual interpretation account of metaphor? It would be nice to have a diagnostic for determining whether metaphor involves no meaning at all, pragmatic intrusion, or semantic, rulebased context-dependence. Now, in fact there is such a diagnostic for distinguishing entailment, presupposition, and implicature: they display rather different inferential behavior. For example, unlike entailments, implicatures are cancelable; unlike both implicature and entailment, presupposition is preserved under negation and modals, and so on. I am not sure we can come up with a similar diagnostic for metaphor as such; but by exploring whether its interpretation displays the inferential properties of semantic entailment, implicature, or presupposition, we may be able to test these positions at least indirectly. Here, the odds seem heavily against Davidsonian accounts: it seems perfectly possible to reason or argue with, and about, metaphors, as in
(1) John is not a wolf but a weasel Prima facie, one would think that one metaphorically expressed property, say, cruelty, is denied and another(say, cowardice) is affirmed of John. That is, the negation does not cancel or undo the metaphorical interpretation altogether, but merely rejects one specific 17 I have discussed the diagnostics for conversational implicature and their applicability to metaphor in Leezenberg (2001: 102-108) . 18 Lepore & Stone (2010) , following Brandom (1994) and Lewis (1979) . It should be noted, incidentally, that Brandom's influential formulation of an inferentialist semantics has little to say about the inferential particularities of conversational implicature, and nothing at all about the place of metaphor and other figures of speech in communication. 19 This aspect of a Davidsonian account has been noticed, and criticized, before: see e.g. Bergmann 1982 , Bezuidenhout 2001 , Leezenberg (2001 .
metaphorically expressed property in favor of another. To judge from such examples, metaphors can indeed be part of a practice of asserting and denying, and thus of giving and asking for reasons; here, the burden of proof would seem to lie with those who claim otherwise.
Metaphors also appear able to set up discourse referents, and thus to make contributions to the conversational scoreboard after all. When John Maynard Keynes wrote about
Wittgenstein's arrival in Cambridge:
(2) Well, God has arrived. I met him on the 5.00PM train He clearly intended his metaphorically used God in referring to Wittgenstein, among others, to establish an antecedent for the anaphoric pronoun him in the following sentence. In other words, whatever other effects (2) may have, it does make a contribution to the conversational scoreboard; otherwise the referent of him would remain a mystery, to be solved by other means.
Another case that seems difficult if not impossible to account for in Davidsonian terms is presented by metaphors involving if-then clauses:
(3) If art is the tip of the iceberg, then I'm the part that's sinking below (Lou Reed)
Here, again, the metaphorical antecedent phrase would seem to set up a set of discourse referents to be picked up in the consequent. Another diagnostic that seems of particular relevance to metaphor is the claimed universal character of principles of rational action, as contrasted with language-or culture-specific semantic rules. Semantic interpretation, it has been argued, involves a knowledge of language-specific rules or conventions; pragmatic inferencing, by contrast, involves not language-or culture specific conventions, but universal principles of human action (Levinson 1983: 120-121; cf. Recanati 2001a: 82 Stern (1985: 685) , Leezenberg (2001: 216) .
communicates that John is sly and cunning; but its Japanese translation (6.b.) conveys that John is a malicious spirit; in fact, the latter may well be taken as literally stating that
John is a fox spirit by many a Japanese speaker. The adverbial explicates the thematic dimension here, leading to two different properties being ascribed to John in each case: respectively, being healthy, and being wealthy.
Further, it has been argued on independent grounds that thematic dimensions involve presupposed rather than asserted information, and that presuppositions survive exactly the kind of embedding shown in 7.a.-d. 22 One cannot conclude from this, however, that the property metaphorical ascribed to John in (7.a.) comes from a set of 'presupposed properties' as Stern (1985 Stern ( , 2000 would have it. 23 Rather, upon further exploration, it emerges that metaphor crucially involves the so-called 'thematic dimension,' i.e., the kind of properties talked about, as the relevant contextual variable. In a thematic dimension of taxonomic properties, (7.a.) is simply literally false; but in a dimension of personality properties, it is true if John is cruel, lonely in old age, etc., and false if, for example, he is cowardly rather than cruel.
On such an account, which one may label one of direct contextual interpretation, metaphor involves the interpretation of a predicate in a novel or unexpected thematic dimension. This account, moreover, suggests that what is presupposed in metaphor is the thematic dimension (e.g., that of personality properties in (7.a. -d.) , and what is asserted is that John has the property of cruel, lonely, etc., given that dimension. Such an account goes a long way in explaining the actual inferential behavior of metaphors, including its embedding under negation, modals, and so on.
Thus, the case for metaphor as not involving meanings, contents or contributions to the conversational record appears to collapse when we explore the effects of specific metaphors in their wider discursive context; likewise, the case for metaphor as an example of semantic underdeterminacy or generality, and as involving pragmatic intrusion, that is, pre-semantic Gricean inferencing, appears at best unproven and at worst implausible. Rather, the inferential evidence discussed above would seem to suggest that metaphor involves a particular -and independently motivated -kind of contextdependence of property expressions, and a particular articulation of presupposed and asserted information. 22 Cf. Bartsch (1987: 5) ; Levinson (1983: 177-199) . 23 Stern's view of presuppositions in terms of sets of properties rather than propositions does not clearly distinguish between what is asserted and what is presupposed in a metaphor, leaving him unable to account for negation and the kinds of embedding noted in 7.a-d; cf. Leezenberg (2001: 202-208) .
Conclusion: Just One More Dogma
Metaphor, in short, appears to involve semantic context-dependence rather than pragmatic inferencing or entirely non-linguistic (cognitive) processes. Against semantic minimalists, one may reply that metaphors do express specifically metaphorical propositions or contents, and involve a kind of context-dependence, the reality of which can be established on independent grounds; the onus of proof would seem to lie with those who deny, against all appearances, that metaphors make any contribution to the conversational scoreboard. Against semantic generalists, one may argue that metaphors appear to involve context-dependence rather than semantic generality, and hence are interpreted by resorting to semantic rules rather than pragmatic principles. There may be no way of telling directly whether a metaphor in isolation does or does not express a proposition; but one may give some reasonably plausible indirect arguments. Most importantly, the inferential behavior of metaphors appears not to conform to the patterns and foremost, a practice of giving and asking for reasons, give an unwarranted priority to assertive language and the exchange of information; Griceans, construing rational linguistic behavior as cooperative, take a culturally and historically very specific ideal of polite conversation over tea as a universal notion of rationality. Both positions, then, appear to rest on folk-theoretical assumptions about rationality, cooperativeness, and speakers' agency and intentions, that have too unthinkingly, and for far too long, been taken for granted as primitive, self-evident, and universal explanatory notions. One may ask if the (ultimately Kantian) concept of rationality underlying the pragmatic-inference approach to metaphor is in the end not as narrow and ethnocentric as the Davidsonian (and ultimately Lockean) notion of literal language. If it is, we may well have isolated another dogma that has strongly -if largely silently -dominated the analytical philosophy of language. My argument here is not so much that metaphor, or poetic language in general, is more 'rational' than authors from Locke to Rorty would have it;
rather, it is that the linguistic forms and practices considered 'rational' and 'literal' in analytic philosophy, and in semantics and pragmatics, rest on a prior exclusion of other kinds and usages of language, which reduces such uses and functions to a secondary, marginal, or even illegitimate status.
The literary modernist beliefs in literal meaning and in the semantic anomaly of metaphors really are dogmas, that is, tacit and tenacious assumptions held to be true as a matter of course rather than explicit doctrines put up for challenges in a rational debate.
Likewise, the third dogma discussed above, i.e., the pragmatist belief in a strict break between the factual and the normative, or between causes and reasons, is generally assumed rather than argued for. We may now have uncovered a final dogma of philosophical pragmatics: the -ultimately Kantian -belief that linguistic communication normally involves the rational and cooperative action of fully conscious and intentionally acting (that is, autonomous) actors. This initially plausible picture, however, is in fact a highly culturally specific one (cf. Leezenberg 2010 
